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From Mabo to Yorta Yorta: Native Title Law in 
Australia 
Dr. Lisa Strelein* 
INTRODUCTION 
In more than a decade since Mabo v. Queensland II’s1 recognition 
of Indigenous peoples’ rights to their traditional lands, the 
jurisprudence of native title has undergone significant development. 
The High Court of Australia decisions in Ward2 and Yorta Yorta3 in 
2002 sought to clarify the nature of native title and its place within 
Australian property law, and within the legal system more generally. 
Since these decisions, lower courts have had time to apply them to 
native title issues across the country. 
This Article briefly examines the history of the doctrine of 
discovery in Australia as a background to the delayed recognition of 
Indigenous rights in lands and resources. It further examines the way 
the Mabo decision sought to reconcile the recognition of rights with 
the protection of the interests of the state. In doing so, the Article 
examines two strands of developing native title jurisprudence that 
have significantly limited the potential of native title for Indigenous 
peoples—the doctrine of extinguishment and the role of law and 
custom in the proof of native title. 
The principles established in Mabo contained the seeds of current 
constraints of native title law, through which Indigenous rights have 
been confined to narrow property interests and subordinated to the 
interests of others. The doctrine of extinguishment, developed in 
 * Manager and Research Fellow, Native Title Research Unit, Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. Appreciation to Lara Wiseman and Serica 
Mackay for research assistance, and to Dr Robert Jansen for comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
 2. W. Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 A.L.R. 1. 
 3. Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538. 
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Ward, has played a significant role in the case law by limiting the 
recognitions and protections of Indigenous peoples’ interests. 
Critiques by United States Indigenous jurists of the act of state 
doctrine are equally applicable. 
The Mabo decision contained elements of recognition that have 
been applied in Canada, South Africa and Malaysia. In particular, the 
emphasis of such application is on the laws and customs of 
Indigenous peoples as the source of rights. However, what is 
generally regarded as a significant contribution to Indigenous rights 
jurisprudence has been a double-edged sword for Indigenous peoples 
seeking native title. The Yorta Yorta decision: (1) highlights that the 
identification of a different source of rights and laws within the state 
has challenged the capacity of the courts; and (2) has resulted in a 
level of incoherence that has in turn placed an undue burden on 
Indigenous peoples in relation to proof. 
This Article analyzes these two elements in order to understand 
the impact of conceptual inconsistencies on the substantive outcomes 
in recent native title determinations, which reinforce the 
subordination of Indigenous rights. 
I. THE DENIAL OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN SETTLER STATES: THE 
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY 
The former British sovereignty that is now Australia is hampered 
with questions of whether Britain still controls Australia’s 
sovereignty jurisdiction and title. Historically, native title, resources 
and jurisdictions questioned the assertion of British sovereignty, 
jurisdiction and title over its Australian territory. The assertions of 
sovereignty were legitimated first by political theory, natural law 
theory and international law, and finally by the municipal courts. The 
initial justification for the acquisition of sovereignty was the 
superiority of the colonizers over the inhabitants, particularly in 
relation to political organization, but also with respect to religion, 
land use, social institutions and skin color.4 The law of nations, while 
positing equality of nations as a central tenet, was also formulated to 
 4. Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An 
Essay on R v. Sparrow, 29 ALTA L. REV. 498, 511 (1991). 
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justify colonization and to limit the recognition of Indigenous 
peoples.5 
Fransisco De Vitoria, a theologian and leading natural law theorist 
of the sixteenth century, acknowledged that the Indigenous peoples of 
the new world should be allowed to govern themselves “both in 
public and private affairs.”6 However, Indigenous peoples were 
equally obliged to accept the benefits of colonization.7 Superiority in 
land use and the “right” of civilized peoples to cultivate the land was 
the justification for taking the territories from the Indigenous 
peoples.8 Recognition was dependent upon a Eurocentric evaluation 
of the social and political development of Indigenous peoples and 
was dismissive of the Indigenous governmental structures that were 
in place.9 
Theorists of natural law and political theory adopted this sixteenth 
century view as an attempt to reconcile natural law rights with the 
colonization of the Americas.10 James Anaya explains that by the 
 5. See BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, HISTORY OF THE INDIES (Andrée Collard trans., 
Harper & Row 1971) (1875); FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the American Indians, in POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 233 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds., Cambridge University Press 1991) 
(1539). Compare HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph 
Van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford University Press 1916) (1608), with HUGO GROTIUS, THE 
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS (A.C. 
Campbell trans., M.W. Dunne 1901) (1738).  
 6. VITORIA, supra note 5, at 251. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 31–38 (Richard H. 
Cox ed., H. Davidson 1982) (1698). This imposition of the West’s vision of the “truth” on the 
non-Western world is the basis of Robert Williams’ critique of the law as supporter of these 
assumptions. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). 
 9. For a summary of the theoretical approaches, see M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION 
AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1926). Vitoria 
viewed the “Indians” of the new world as having “a certain method in their affairs” with 
“polities” that are “orderly arranged”—laws, economy and religion. VITORIA, supra note 5, at 
127. Yet, they are not “proper laws,” and they are not capable of governing themselves as a 
state. Id. at 161. Thus colonizers could assume authority for the Indian’s own benefit. Id. 
Similarly, where they refused, this justified war and conquest. Id. at 156. 
 10. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE: THE ENGLISH VERSION (Howard Warrender 
ed., Clarendon Press, 1983) (1651); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett, 
1994) (1668); SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, 2 DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (C.H. 
Oldfather trans., Oceania 1964) (1688); CHRISTIAN WOLFF, 2 JUS GENTIUM METHODO 
SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM xxxii, xxxix (Joseph H. Drake trans., Oceania, New York 1964) 
(1764). 
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early nineteenth century, positivist international law began to reframe 
the law of nations as existing “between,” rather than “above,” 
states.11 International law extended rights, responsibilities and 
protections to the community of states who recognized one another. 
In the earliest understandings of the international law of nations, 
“discovery” carried with it rights against other European nations of 
exclusive trade, purchase of lands and the right of conquest.12 The 
motivation of European powers in securing trading partners and allies 
was superseded by a new, more intrusive agenda. The primary focus 
of colonial expansion turned to the control of lands and resources.13 
The “discovering” states laid claim to all the lands of the colonized 
territory as a sole sovereign. For some theorists, the absence of a 
political force in the community of nations meant that Indigenous 
lands with no colonial presence could be legally occupied as terra 
nullius, i.e., viewed as vacant land.14  
From the earliest of times, the rules of international relations and 
the acquisition of territory were domesticated into the British 
common law.15 As international law assumed a more statist character, 
Indigenous peoples were less the subjects of international law and 
more the objects of domestic jurisdiction. M.F. Lindley, in his 1926 
study, suggested that once colonization had become a fait accompli, 
international law recognized its results.16 The implications of 
colonization became primarily a matter of domestic law. 
Nevertheless, British courts had always purported to recognize the 
rights of inhabitants of newly “acquired” territories where their 
traditions and values were similar to those of the British.17 In 
 11. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (2d ed. 2004) 
(citing LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 383–84 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 
1920)). 
 12. Id. at 29. 
 13. Jane Smith, Republicanism, Imperialism, and Sovereignty: A History of the Doctrine 
of Tribal Sovereignty, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 527, 535 (1988). 
 14. ANAYA, supra note 11, at 29. 
 15. See Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 848, 895–96.  
 16. LINDLEY, supra note 9, at 45–46. 
 17. See, for example, Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398, in which the test had a 
distinctly religious aspect: 
[F]or if a King come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing that he hath vilce et 
nicis potestatem, he may at his pleasure alter and change the laws of the kingdom: but 
until he doth make alteration of those laws the ancient laws of that kingdom remain. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/14
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contrast, the legitimacy of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty was 
justified if the territories could be characterized as a political and 
legal vacuum.18 This reasoning led to the development of a “test” of 
civilization drawing on political and natural law theories that would 
determine the rights of peoples.  
The classic pronouncement of the methods of acquiring new 
territories under British common law is found in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.19 Each of the methods had 
different implications: 
Plantations, or colonies in distant countries, are either such 
where the lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by 
finding them desert and uncultivated, and peopling them from 
the mother country; or where, when already cultivated, they 
have either gained, by conquest, or ceded to us by treaties. And 
both these rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at least 
upon that of nations.20 
Where a colony was established by force, through conquest or 
cession, in a territory whose inhabitants had a legal and political 
system in place, the doctrine suggests that the local law continued 
unless contrary to British concepts of morality and justice, or until it 
was altered by the Crown.21 This was distinguished from the rules of 
settlement, by which the Crown could discover an uninhabited 
country and settle it with English subjects, and by which the laws of 
England as appropriate to the circumstances would be immediately 
transplanted.22 
But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under 
his subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that they be 
not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature . . . .  
Id.; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 199–200. See generally MICHAEL ASCH, HOME AND 
NATIVE LAND: ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 42 (1984). 
 18. Campbell, 98 Eng. Rep. at 898. 
 19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 104 (Legal 
Classics Library 1983) (1823). 
 20. Id.  
 21. The basis of the conquest rule can be traced to the decision in Campbell, 98 Eng. Rep. 
at 895–96; see also Blankard v. Galdy, (1693) 90 Eng. Rep. 1089; Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 
Eng. Rep. 377. 
 22. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 104–05. 
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Where lands were already inhabited, the doctrine of discovery did 
not envisage immediate acquisition of sovereignty unless ceded or 
conquered. However, a fourth method of acquisition of territories 
emerged from British colonial practice which turned on Blackstone’s 
idea of cultivation and the test for social organization.23 This latter 
category of acquisition by settlement simply did not recognize the 
occupation of territory by the original inhabitants. 
The particular interpretation of what constituted “desert and 
uncultivated” did not necessarily coincide with Blackstone’s own 
conception of the justification for acquiring title to lands. Indeed, 
Blackstone went so far as to question the role of the law in 
legitimizing the acts of state that wrested sovereignty and title from 
Indigenous peoples.24 The common law approach to conquest and 
settlement relied on assumptions of superiority, whether religious or 
political, that characterized the political and natural law theories.25 
The following section examines how the courts incorporated these 
justifications in their “reasoning” to reassert a test of civilization by 
which the British superiority could be used to justify the denial of the 
rights and interests of the Indigenous peoples and of their sovereignty 
and independence. 
II. CONQUEST AND ACTS OF STATE: THE UNITED STATES’ 
APPROACH 
Between 1823 and 1832, when natural law theory still held sway, 
the United States Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, 
 23. This method is epitomized by the Privy Council decision in Cooper v. Stuart, (1889) 
14 App. Cas. 286, 291. 
 24. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 2. Blackstone’s distinctions were primarily 
concerned with the implications of introducing the law of England to new territories, rather than 
of recognizing the rights of the Indigenous inhabitants. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 7, 
outlined a concern for the treatment of Indigenous peoples: 
But how far the seising on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring 
the innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders 
in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such a 
conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to christianity, deserved well to be 
considered by those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing 
mankind. 
 25. ANAYA, supra note 11, at 24. 
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handed down a series of decisions that formed the basis for the 
common law recognition of Aboriginal rights in the United States, 
Canada, and eventually Australia.26 In Johnson v. M’Intosh,27 the 
Court had its first opportunity to face squarely the issue of rights over 
Indian lands.28 Confronted with a dispute between colonists over 
deeds to Indian lands, Chief Justice Marshall treated the loss of 
independence and control over lands as accomplished fact.29 
While conceding that the “pretension of converting discovery of 
inhabited country” into a form of title was an “extravagant” one, 
Marshall abdicated judicial responsibility for the rights of peoples 
against the exercise of power by the state.30 Phillip Frickey argued 
that in embracing colonialism, Chief Justice Marshall relied on two 
“starkly colonial visions” of cultural superiority and judicial 
inferiority.31 For example, Marshall stated: “Conquest gives a title 
which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private 
and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the 
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”32  
In Johnson, Marshall both recognized European arrogance and 
reinforced it, relying on a perception of the courts’ institutional 
impotence.33 While Marshall expressly avoided judgments about the 
 26. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958); R v. Sioui, [1990] 70 D.L.R. 427, 449; 
Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 60. 
 27. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 28. One significant earlier case in which Chief Justice Marshall commented on the status 
of the lands past the Western frontier was Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810). Marshall 
referred to Indian lands as “the vacant lands within the United States.” Id. at 142. Williams 
described this case as the “preliminary ceremonies in the legal interment [sic] of the doctrine 
that American Indians possessed natural rights to the lands they had occupied since time 
immemorial.” WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 309. 
 29. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591 
 30. Id. 
 31. Philip Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 388 (1993). 
 32. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588; see also id. at 572, 589, 591–92. Chief Justice Marshall used 
the term “courts of the conqueror.” Id. at 588; see also Hamar Foster, Forgotten Arguments: 
Aboriginal Title and Sovereignty in Canada Jurisdiction Act Cases, 21 MAN. L.J. 343, 355–56 
(1992); Frickey, supra note 31, at 394–95; Brian Slattery, Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial 
Claims, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 681, 685 (1991). 
 33. Chief Justice Marshall stressed the need to accept “the actual state of things,” and 
engaged in a process of rationalizing the acts of the state in law. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591. 
Williams argued that in M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall merely legitimated the outcome of 
United States military campaigns and commercial agreements, and “silently ignored” the rights 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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justness of colonization or the assertions of superiority, the decision 
“immunized” those questions from judicial review.34 Robert Williams 
noted that “[t]he dominant themes of Marshall’s denial of Indian 
natural-law rights in Johnson are clearly established in those early 
evasions of judicial accountability.”35 Johnson established the 
dichotomy between power and law that was to form the foundation of 
the judicial inaction that has become known as the “act of state” 
doctrine. 
In Johnson, the doctrine of discovery was adopted into the 
domestic law of the United States, but was formulated on the 
narrowest construction. This gave the discovering nation the 
exclusive right to extinguish Indigenous peoples right of occupancy, 
and recognized no natural law based rights to sovereignty in the 
Indigenous peoples.36 
[T]he rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, 
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable 
extent, impaired . . . [T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their 
power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever 
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, 
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.37 
Later cases involving the Cherokee Nation elaborated on the 
“diminished” sovereignty alluded to in Johnson.38 The Cherokee 
of the Indigenous peoples. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 308. However, Marshall displayed his 
own prejudices and falsities: 
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation 
was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in 
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a 
distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as 
they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence. 
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590. 
 This sentiment reiterated Marshall’s earlier observation that there was “some excuse, if not 
justification, [for colonization] in the character and habits of the people whose rights had been 
wrested from them.” Id. at 589. 
 34. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588; see also Frickey, supra note 31, at 388–89. 
 35. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 312. 
 36. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573–74; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 313. 
 37. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
 38. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); see also Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
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p225 Strelein book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From Mabo to Yorta Yorta 233 
 
 
 
cases, unlike Johnson, involved a claim by Indigenous peoples in 
which sovereignty was a central issue.39 While dismissing the claim 
on a technical, jurisdictional question, Chief Justice Marshall 
constructed a model of Indian status that posited the Indigenous 
peoples not as foreign states, but certainly as sovereign entities within 
the Constitution of the United States.40 Remarkably, Marshall 
accepted the Cherokee’s arguments and underlying assumptions 
claiming their status as “nation,” as well as the integrity of their 
relationship with the United States under treaty.41 Marshall stated that 
the Cherokee, with other Indian nations, were “a distinct political 
society.”42 
This construction of Indian status was confirmed in Worcester v. 
Georgia43 in 1832. Chief Justice Marshall concluded that Indian 
nations were “distinct political communities, having territorial 
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a 
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only 
acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States.”44 
During this period, there was some dissent among Chief Justice 
Marshall’s peers, who saw the Indian nations as foreign and 
independent.45 Although Marshall’s peers noted that tribes may have 
entered into a protection arrangement with the more powerful state, 
they considered this a frequent occurrence among independent 
nations.46 However, the argument was defeated and the principle of 
equal sovereignty was replaced by one of “relative sovereignty,” 
which established the hierarchy between Indigenous peoples and the 
colonizing state in the common law under the “dependent nation” 
idea.47 
 39. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1. 
 40. Id. at 18. 
 41. Id. at 15. 
 42. Id. at 16. 
 43. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 515 (1832). 
 44. Id. at 557. 
 45. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 146 (1810) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Cherokee Nation, 
30 U.S. at 59 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id.; see also Thomas Flanagan, From Indian Title to Aboriginal Rights, in LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN A NEW LAND: ESSAYS IN WESTERN CANADIAN LEGAL HISTORY 81, 87 (Louis A. 
Knafla ed., 1986); Patrick Macklem, First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the 
Canadian Legal Imagination, 36 MCGILL L.J. 382 (1991). 
 47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 105. Blackstone characterized the American 
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While less strident in its commitment to judicial impotence, 
Worcester v. Georgia reaffirmed the act of state doctrine: “[P]ower, 
war, conquest, give rights, which after possession, are conceded by 
the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom 
they descend. We proceed, then, to the actual state of things . . . .”48 
Historical acts of aggression by the state were seen as merely part 
of the fabric of legal history.49 Williams concluded: 
White society’s exercise of power over Indian tribes received 
the sanction of the Rule of Law in Johnson v. McIntosh . . . 
[and] [w]hile the tasks of conquest and colonization had not 
yet been fully actualized on the entire American continent, the 
originary legal rules and principles of federal Indian law set 
down by Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh and its discourse of 
conquest ensured that future acts of genocide would proceed 
on a rationalized, legal basis.50  
By assuming the supremacy of the federal government, the 
doctrine legitimized the exercise of power to extinguish the rights of 
Indigenous peoples without consent and unrestricted by any natural 
or common law rights. Chief Justice Marshall’s rejection of the 
natural law literature and his embrace of the state power were 
explicit. For example, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice 
Marshall stated that “natural law and abstract principles of justice 
must take a back seat to power and accomplished fact.”51 
In short, respect for the equality of peoples was disregarded in the 
face of absolute power. While Indigenous peoples continued to 
exercise sovereignty over their remaining lands and peoples, the law 
no longer recognized their independence. The creation of a hierarchy 
of sovereignty subordinated Indian nations and left Indigenous 
peoples without recourse against the state’s exercise of power to 
dispossess them of their lands. The status of Indian Nations was 
plantations as having been obtained by conquest, by driving out the Indigenous inhabitants, or 
by treaty. Id. As such, “the common law of England . . . has no allowance or authority there; 
they being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions.” Id. 
 48. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543. 
 49. Frickey, supra note 31, at 395. 
 50. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 317. 
 51. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/14
p225 Strelein book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From Mabo to Yorta Yorta 235 
 
 
 
domesticated by the act of state doctrine. The relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and the colonizing states became a matter solely 
for domestic law. 
III. CHARACTERIZING AUSTRALIA AS A SETTLED COLONY 
The actions of the colonial officials in Australia were inconsistent 
with the Admiralty’s instructions to Lieutenant James Cook in 1768, 
which reflected the more accepted approach of building alliances, 
establishing trade, and securing settlements.52 Colonization 
proceeded on the false assumption that the continent was sparsely 
populated.53 As Henry Reynolds observed, the advantages of 
assuming the absence of people were so great that the legal doctrine 
simply continued to depict the colony as one acquired by occupation 
of terra nullius.54 
The settlement thesis, which allowed the “discovery” of inhabited 
territories, was extended to deny rights under the law of the land as 
well as under international law. The fiction of terra nullius asserted 
that the discovery of uninhabited lands gave rise to rights of 
occupation in the sovereign, leading to a greater fiction in domestic 
law of the state as first occupier of all the territories claimed, 
articulated in the doctrine of absolute Crown ownership.55 The 
interests of the emerging colonial state were served best by the 
complete denial of the rights of the Indigenous inhabitants of the 
“acquired territory.” The fiction of terra nullius fulfilled the imperial 
 52. Garth Nettheim, Mabo and Aboriginal Political Rights: The Potential for Inherent 
Rights and Aboriginal Self-Government, in MABO AND NATIVE TITLE: ORIGINS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 46, 46 (Will Sanders ed., 1994). 
 53. Reynolds suggests that this may have been in part due to information provided by 
Joseph Banks that the environment was too hostile to sustain substantial populations. HENRY 
REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS ON RACE, STATE AND NATION ix–x, 
17–21 (1996). However, with the arrival of the First Fleet, information to the contrary quickly 
came to light. See WATKIN TENCH, SYDNEY’S FIRST FOUR YEARS 51–52 (1961) (noting that the 
area around Sydney Harbour was “more populous than it was generally believed to be in 
Europe”). 
 54. REYNOLDS, supra note 53, at x. 
 55. See David Ritter, The “Rejection of Terra Nullius” in Mabo: A Critical Analysis, 18 
SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 5, 63 (1996).  
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imperative for control over resources, allowing the state to govern the 
use of land and resources to serve its own purposes.56  
Such wholesale dispossession was not unique to Australian 
colonies. However, even the limited recognition of rights of the 
indigenous peoples, as in the Marshall decisions, was not adopted in 
Australia. Nineteenth century Australian courts were aware of the 
Marshall decisions.57 Justice Willis of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales followed similar reasoning as that of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh in describing the Aboriginal peoples of Australia as 
domestic dependent nations. In R v. Bon Jon,58 Justice Willis 
conceived Indigenous peoples as “dependent allies” who were 
entitled to be left undisturbed in their possession, save for the right of 
the Crown to preemption.59 Willis refused to continue the trial of an 
Aboriginal person for a breach of British criminal law.60 Instead, he 
accepted evidence that the Indigenous people had a complete system 
of punishment among themselves that was appropriate for every sort 
of offense.61 Further, Willis found that British law was not applicable 
to the Indigenous peoples, particularly in disputes among 
themselves.62 Therefore, Willis considered that Indigenous peoples 
were not “unqualified subjects” of the Crown and the introduction of 
the common law to the colony was thought insufficient to extinguish 
Indigenous laws and jurisdiction.63 
 56. Smith, supra note 13, at 541. 
 57. See R v. Jemmy (V.S. Ct.), in ARGUS, Sept. 7, 1860 (referring to the “laws of the 
Conqueror” but determining that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court is [supreme] in fact, throughout 
the colony, and such regard to all persons in it”). 
 58. R v. Bon Jon (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in PORT PHILLIP PATRIOT, Sept. 16, 1841. 
 59. That is, the right as against other European nations (and against individuals) to 
purchase lands from the Indigenous peoples. Id. This decision was a likely contributing factor 
to the dismissal of Willis by the New South Wales Supreme Court in 1843. See John Hookey, 
Settlement and Sovereignty, in ABORIGINES AND THE LAW 1, 2 (Peter Hanks & Brian Keon-
Cohen eds., 1984). 
 60. R v. Bon Jon (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in PORT PHILLIP PATRIOT, Sept. 16, 1841. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.; see also Hookey, supra note 59, at 2–5 (reviewing the Bon Jon case); REYNOLDS, 
supra note 53, at 63–64, 69–71 (discussing a 1847 South Australian Grand Jury decision). 
 63. R v. Bon Jon (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in PORT PHILLIP PATRIOT, Sept. 16, 1841. 
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Justice Willis recognized that the imposition of an alien legal 
system on peoples who had no comprehension of it was simply 
discriminatory.64 Willis stated: 
As a British subject he is entitled to be tried by his peers. Who 
are the peers of a black man? Are those of whose laws, 
customs, language, and religion he is totally ignorant his 
peers? He is tried in his native land by a new race to him, and 
by laws of which he knows nothing.65 
However, an earlier case had drawn a distinction between the 
Indigenous peoples of Australia and those of North America. In R v. 
Jack Congo Murrell,66 Justice Burton of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court argued: 
[A]lthough it be granted that the aboriginal natives of New 
Holland are entitled to be regarded by Civilized nations as a 
free and independent people, and are entitled to the possession 
of those rights which as such are valuable to them, yet the 
various tribes had not attained at the first settlement of the 
English people among them to such a position in point of 
numbers and civilization, and to such a form of Government 
and laws, as to be entitled to be recognized as so many 
sovereign states governed by laws of their own.67  
Even in Murrell, the Court showed some understanding of the 
natural law traditions. The Court recognized the private rights of 
Indigenous peoples and considered their rights to be protected by the 
common law at least in theory, if not in practice.68 This recognition 
 64. Id. 
 65. Mary W. Daunton-Fear & Arie Frieberg, “Gum-tree” Justice: Aborigines and the 
Courts, in THE AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 45, 49 (Duncan Chappel & Paul 
Wilson eds., 2d ed. 1977) (quoting G.B. Vasey, John Walpole Willis, The First Resident Judge 
of Port Phillip, 1911 VICTORIAN HIST. MAG. 48); see also M’Hugh v. Robertson (1885) 11 
V.L.R. 410, 431. The difficulties were admitted by the High Court of Australia in Tuckier v. 
The King (1934) 52 C.L.R. 335. Justice Starke noted: “He lived under the protection of the law 
in force in Australia, but had no conception of its standards. Yet by the law he must be tried. He 
understood little or nothing of the proceedings or of their consequences to him.” Id. at 349. 
 66. R v. Jack Congo Murrell (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in SYDNEY HERALD, Feb. 8, 1836, aff’d, R v. 
Wedge (1976) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 581. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
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distinguishes between the assertion of sole sovereignty and the denial 
of rights; that is, an assertion of sovereignty does not necessarily 
result in loss of title to lands and resources. 
In MacDonald v. Levy,69 Justice Burton denied that Indigenous 
peoples had laws at all.70 Instead, the inhabitants of the colony were 
described as “the wandering tribes of its natives, living without 
certain habitation and without laws.”71 The “scale of organization” 
test had become a useful tool for denying Indigenous peoples’ 
sovereignty in international law. This particular interpretation of the 
test allowed the courts to ignore the fact of a self-governing and 
sovereign people with their own laws. The Australian legal system 
can, therefore, be credited with an ignominious originality: 
[T]he distinctive and unenviable contribution of Australian 
jurisprudence to the history of relations between Europeans 
and the Indigenous people of the non-European world . . . was 
not to provide justification for conquest or cession of land or 
assumption of sovereignty—others had done that before 
Australia was settled—but to deny the right, even the fact, of 
possession to people who had lived on their land for 40,000 
years.72 
Regardless of any natural law rights to retain even private rights 
or possessions, prescriptions for peaceful settlement would not be 
observed in practice as the battles for land were already being fought 
and lost at the hands of the colonists.73 The settlers and squatters were 
aware of the claims of Indigenous peoples to particular tracts of 
lands, but they had the intellectual affirmation of superiority and the 
sanction of the state. In effect, the absence of an Indigenous legal 
system became an irrebuttable presumption. 
 69. MacDonald v. Levy (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in SYDNEY HERALD, Mar. 11, 1833. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. The same reasoning led the Privy Council of England to conclude that “there was 
no land law” existing in the colony at the time of colonization in Cooper v. Stuart, (1889) 14 
App. Cas. 286, 292 (P.C.). 
 72. HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND 3–4 (2d ed. 1992). 
 73. Id. at 21–22 (claiming that “[d]espite coming under the protection of the common law, 
over 20,000 Aborigines were killed in the course of Australian settlement . . . and neither 
lawyers nor judges appear to have done much to bring the killing to an end”). 
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The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council gave credence to this 
view in 1889 in Cooper v. Stuart,74 on appeal from the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales.75 The Court distinguished New South 
Wales as “a Colony which consisted of a tract of territory practically 
unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law.”76 The notion 
that Indigenous peoples possessed any rights after the assertion of 
sovereignty was flatly rejected in Cooper.77 
The fundamental contradiction between law and fact created a 
dilemma for future courts in which evidence was actually presented 
regarding indigenous peoples’ laws and political systems. In 1971, a 
single judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory struggled 
with the incongruent fact and legal fiction. Milirrpum v. Nabalco78 
was the first case in which Indigenous peoples brought evidence of 
their continuing ownership of traditional lands, seeking a declaration 
of their title.79  
In that case, the Yolgnu people brought an action against the 
Nabalco Company and the Commonwealth for recognition of their 
right to control access to lands on the Gove Peninsula over which 
mining leases had been granted.80 For Justice Blackburn, the evidence 
revealed: 
[A] subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country 
in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable 
order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of 
personal whim or influence. If ever a system could be called “a 
 74. Cooper, 14 App. Cas. 286. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 291–92. 
 77. This view was reaffirmed by the Privy Council of England in Re Southern Rhodesia, 
[1919] A.C. 211, 233–34 (P.C.). In 1976, Justice Rath of the New South Wales Supreme Court 
stated that “[u]pon Settlement, there was, in the colony, only one sovereign, namely the King of 
England, and only one law, namely the English law.” R v. Wedge (1976) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 581, 
581. Justice Rath followed the decision in R v. Jack Congo Murrell (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in SYDNEY 
HERALD, Feb. 8, 1836. 
 78. Milirrpum v. Nabalco (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141. 
 79. Id. 
 80. The Yolgnu unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Government in 1963. The “bark 
petition” hangs in the Parliament House in Canberra. 
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government of laws, and not of men”, it is that shown in the 
evidence before me.81 
Despite this admission, Justice Blackburn felt compelled by the 
decision in Cooper v. Stuart to disregard the facts and arguments 
before the court.82 The rationalization for the rejection of the claim 
turned on the idea of property.83 His Honour concluded that there was 
so little resemblance between “property” in our understanding and 
the claims of the plaintiffs, that they could not be argued to have a 
proprietary interest in the soil.84 
Justice Blackburn perpetuated the fictional claim to title by 
relegating the facts into irrelevance, reasoning that the colony’s 
characterization was a matter of law, not of fact.85 Blackburn 
followed the Privy Council decision and concluded that a common 
law doctrine of communal title did not form and “never ha[d] formed, 
part of the law of any part of Australia.”86 
This discussion illustrates the responsibility that the courts bear 
for the current status of Aboriginal law in Australian society. The 
choice was available to the courts to acknowledge Aboriginal law to 
some degree. In the United States, the Marshall court had established 
the “domestic dependent nation” doctrine under which the Indigenous 
peoples of North America were regarded as sovereign, although 
within a hierarchy. Thus, their laws continued, subject to the 
imposition of a level of jurisdiction in the federal government.87 
While this approach should not be considered a model, it places the 
Australian courts’ approach in a contemporary context. 
 81. Milirrpum, 17 F.L.R. at 267. Further, Justice Blackburn stated that “the natives had 
established a subtle and elaborate system of social rules and customs which was highly adapted 
to the country in which the people lived and provided a stable order of society remarkably free 
from the vagaries of personal whim or influence.” Id. at 143; see also id. at 223, 250. 
 82. Id. at 245. 
 83. Id. at 198. 
 84. Id. at 272–73. 
 85. Id. at 244. 
 86. Id. at 245. 
 87. This was the case, for example, in India and even closer to home in Papua New 
Guinea. See Admin. of Papua v. Daera Guba (1973) 130 C.L.R. 353, 397. The decision in 
Daera Guba is particularly interesting given Barwick’s criticisms of the High Court’s Mabo 
decision. 
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The Australian courts were aware of the Marshall decisions, as is 
evidenced by comments of Justices Willis and Burton in the 1830s.88 
However, the courts chose to distinguish the cases in Australia with 
reference to the “level of social organization test.”89 The approach by 
the United States Supreme Court was also distinguished on the basis 
of the settlement and conquest doctrines.90 In Milirrpum, the 
classification of the colony as settled was considered sufficient to 
deny a sphere of operation for Aboriginal law or a right to possession 
of their lands even as a private interest.91  
Important implications of the settlement fiction reverberate 
through current doctrines that impact the relationships between 
Indigenous peoples and the institutions of the state. Justice Kriewaldt 
thought it would be a “serious reflection upon our capacity to 
assimilate the aboriginal part of our community” if Indigenous 
peoples were not punished for breaches of British law.92 For Justice 
Chamberlain in R v. Skinny Jack,93 assimilation was the goal: 
“‘[T]heir first lesson should be to obey our laws.’”94 
The fictions of terra nullius, settlement and absolute Crown 
ownership that denied the continuing rights of Indigenous peoples to 
land were a direct result of the courts’ deference to the power of the 
state and the assertion of sole sovereignty. While the law maintained 
the appearance of consistency through this hall of mirrors, the gross 
abuse of rights perpetrated under its protection remain the “darkest 
aspect of the history of this nation.”95 Justice Blackburn’s decision in 
Milirrpum v. Nabalco remains perhaps the best illustration of the 
fracture between law and fact that has characterized much of 
Australia’s legal history. The decision prompted the government to 
 88. See Hookey, supra note 59, at 4-5 (discussing R v. Bon Jon (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in PORT 
PHILLIP PATRIOT, Sept. 16, 1841 and R v. Jack Congo Murrell (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in SYDNEY 
HERALD, Feb. 8, 1836). 
 89. Justice Willis in R. v. Bon Jon, (N.S.W.S. Ct.), in PORT PHILLIP PATRIOT, Sept. 20, 
1841, is a notable exception. 
 90. Cooper v. Stuart, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286, 291 (P.C.). 
 91. Milirrpum, 17 F.L.R. at 244. 
 92. M. C. Kriewaldt, The Application of the Criminal Law to the Aborigines of the 
Northern Territory of Australia, 5 W. AUST. L. REV. 1, 24 (1960). 
 93. R v. Skinny Jack (unreported decision, July 13, 1964), cited in Daunton-Fear & 
Frieberg, supra note 65, at 60. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 109. 
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conduct a commission of inquiry into Aboriginal land rights.96 The 
government accepted evidence of clear and ongoing occupation of 
the lands under Aboriginal law and sought to establish a statutory 
scheme to hear claims for return of lands and to vest inalienable 
title.97 But the legislation only applied in the Northern Territory.98 
IV. THE MABO DECISION: “OVERTURNING TERRA NULLIUS”? 
With the authority of the Privy Council, the law seemed settled by 
the 1850s, particularly in light of Milirrpum a century later.99 The 
decision in Cooper v. Stuart clearly asserted the settled status of the 
colony of New South Wales and the implication of settlement for the 
introduction of British law. However, the decision was strongly 
criticized by commentators and overseas courts,100 and in the years 
following Milirrpum the High Court hinted at the possibility that it 
would be willing to hear an argument on the issue.  
In Coe v. Commonwealth,101 the High Court foreshadowed its 
willingness to hear argument on the implications of the Crown’s 
assertion of sovereignty, despite rejecting the case on its pleadings.102 
In addition, various judges questioned the correctness of the findings 
in Cooper.103 Justices Jacobs and Murphy both agreed that argument 
 96. ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS COMM’N, FIRST REPORT 1–3 (1973) (on file with author); 
see also ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS COMM’N, PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTL., PAPER NO. 69, SECOND REPORT (1975) (on file with author). 
 97. Id.  
 98. The resulting legislation is the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976. 
 99. Until the passage of the Australia Acts, 1986, the Privy Council of England was the 
highest court of appeal for Australian cases.  
 100. M.C. Blumm & Justin Malbon, Aboriginal Title, Common Law and Federalism: A 
Different Perspective, in THE EMERGENCE OF AUSTRALIA LAW (M.P. Ellinghaus et al. eds., 
1989); John Hookey, The Gove Land Rights Case: A Judicial Dispensation for the Taking of 
Aboriginal Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L. REV. 85 (1972); Kent McNeil, A Question of Title: 
Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals?, 16 MONASH U. L. REV. 
91 (1990). The decision was criticized by the Canadian Supreme Court in Calder v. Attorney 
Gen. of B.C., [1973] 34 D.L.R. 3d 145, 218. In Milirrpum, Justice Blackburn relied on the 
decision of the lower court in Calder, [1971] 13 D.L.R. 3d 14, to assert that no such principle 
existed in Canadian law. Milirrpum v. Nabalco (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141, 223.  
 101. Coe v. Commonwealth (1979) 53 A.L.J.R. 403, 408, 411–12. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 411–12; see also Justice Gibbs’ comments, id. at 408, and Justice Murphy’s 
comment that “[t]he statement by the Privy Council may be regarded as having been made in 
ignorance or as a convenient falsehood to justify the taking of Aborigines’ land,” id. at 412. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/14
p225 Strelein book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From Mabo to Yorta Yorta 243 
 
 
 
should be heard on the issue of whether Australia was a conquered 
territory.104 Justice Murphy argued there was sufficient material to 
support the argument,105 and Justice Jacobs noted that no decision of 
an Australian court had confirmed the categorization.106  
In Gerhardy v. Brown,107 Justice Deane expressed grave 
reservations about the law as it stood: 
[T]he common law of this land has still not reached the stage 
of retreat from injustice which the law of Illinois and Virginia 
had reached in 1823 when Marshall C.J., in Johnson v. 
McIntosh, accepted that, subject to the assertion of ultimate 
dominion . . . by the State, the “original inhabitants” should be 
recognised as having “a legal as well as just claim” to retain 
the occupancy of their traditional lands.108 
By this time, proceedings were under way in the most important 
case in relation to Aboriginal land rights in Australia.  
In 1981, Eddie Koiki Mabo and four other plaintiffs from Murray 
Island in the Torres Strait claimed title to their lands under a system 
of Meriam land law, including Malo’s law.109 In June 1992, a 
majority of six judges of the High Court in Mabo v. Queensland 
agreed that traditional Indigenous titles to land in the Murray Islands 
had continued after the colonization of the continent.110 The High 
Court found that the common law recognized and protected the 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 411. Justice Jacobs stated that “while the view has generally been taken that 
Australian colonies were settled colonies . . . there is no actual decision of this Court or of the 
Privy Council to that effect.” Id. Compare Justice Gibbs’ position with that of Justice Aicken, 
who admitted that this was an arguable question if properly raised. Id. at 408. 
 107. Gerhardy v. Brown (1985) 159 C.L.R. 70. 
 108. See also N. Land Council v. Commonwealth II (1987) 61 A.L.J.R. 616. 
 109. The five original claimants were Eddie Koiki Mabo, Sam Passi, Reverend Dave Passi, 
James Rice, and Celuia Salee. For a version of events leading to the beginning of the case, see 
NONIE SHARP, NO ORDINARY JUDGMENT 22–30 (1996). Sharp describes Malo’s law as the set 
of principles or rules, identified by the witnesses, that combine religious and secular law, 
joining together the eight totemic clans of the Meriam. Id. at xx. Malo’s law determines rights 
to land and inheritance. Id. at 7. 
 110. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. Eddie Koiki Mabo died six months 
before the High Court handed down its decision. The personal cost of his struggle for land 
rights is documented in his diaries and papers, which are held in the National Library of 
Australia. 
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traditional Indigenous titles to land across the continent.111 The 
settled status of the colonies was not contested, but the Court was 
prepared to review the implications of “settlement” for the 
recognition of Indigenous law and rights.112 The Court dismissed the 
earlier doctrine, which denied the rights of Indigenous peoples based 
on a supposed scale of social organization, as unjust and 
discriminatory.113 The theory was criticized as “false in fact and 
unacceptable in our society.”114 In recognizing that Indigenous 
peoples’ rights to land had survived colonization, the Court 
overturned jurisprudence that held Australia as a land without law 
prior to the arrival of the colonizers. 
Interestingly, throughout the judgment the High Court relied on 
positive and normative international law and shared colonial legal 
jurisprudence regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples. The High 
Court based the recognition of native title of Indigenous land law on 
the concepts of “justice and human rights (especially equality before 
the law).”115 Justice Brennan concluded:  
The fiction by which the rights and interests of Indigenous 
inhabitants in land were treated as non-existent was justified 
by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this 
country. . . . Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days 
for refusing to recognize the rights and interests in land of the 
[I]ndigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and 
discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be 
accepted.116 
The Court applied a combination of positive international law, 
decisions of International Courts, and common law practices of other 
settled states. The Court paid particular attention to decisions of the 
Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria,117 as 
 111. Id. at 54–57, 82, 182. 
 112. Id. at 57, 82–83, 183–84. 
 113. Justice Brennan stated “that it is imperative in today’s world that the common law 
should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial discrimination.” Id. at 42. 
 114. Id. at 40; see also id. at 182, 187. 
 115. Id. at 30, 58. 
 116. Id. at 42. 
 117. Amodu Tijani v. Sec’y, S. Nig., [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.). 
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well as to common law jurisprudence from the British colonies of 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States.118  
Justice Brennan affirmed the view of the Privy Council in Amodu 
Tijani “that a mere change in sovereignty does not extinguish native 
title to land.”119 In this regard, the Court sought to remove the 
distinction between Indigenous peoples of a settled colony and those 
of a conquered or ceded colony for the purpose of recognizing rights 
and interests in land.120  
To counter criticisms of unwarranted judicial activism, 
commentators argued that the Mabo decision was merely a correction 
of local laws to come into line with the common law of the rest of the 
world.121 Sir Anthony Mason, Chief Justice of the Court at the time, 
argued that rather than representing an “adventure” on the part of the 
Court, the decision merely reflected a view that had not yet been 
accepted by Australia, but which had been accepted “in the great 
common law jurisdictions of the world and the international 
Court.”122  
 118. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 43 (referring to the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Optional Protocol, which, while not part of Australian law, are an 
important influence on its development). In relation to international court decisions, particular 
reliance was placed on the decision of the International Court of Justice in Western Sahara, 
Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39. See Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 40–41. Justice Brennan and 
Justices Deane and Gaudron discussed the Privy Council decision in Amodu Tijani, 2 A.C. 399. 
Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 44–46, 71–72. Emphasis was placed on decisions of overseas courts in R 
v. Symonds, [1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (P.C.), and Te Weehi v. Reg’l Fisheries Officer, [1986] 1 
N.Z.L.R. 682 (P.C.), from New Zealand; Calder v. Attorney Gen. of B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, 
Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister, Indian Affairs and N. Dev., [1979] 107 D.L.R. 513, and R v. 
Sparrow, [1990] 70 D.L.R. 385, from Canada; and Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), 
and United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1914), in the United States. 
 119. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 56–57 (referring to Amodu Tijani, 2 A.C. at 407); see also 
Adeyinka Oyekan v. Musediku Adele, (1957) 1 W.L.R. 876, 880 (stating that “the courts will 
assume that the British Crown intends that the rights of property of the inhabitants are to be 
fully respected”). 
 120. In Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 57, Justice Brennan relied on Amodu Tijani, 2 A.C. at 407. For 
a discussion of the distinction between the categories for the acquisition of territories by states 
under the law of nations and under the common law, see Ritter, supra note 55. 
 121. See Garth Nettheim, Judicial Revolution or Cautious Correction? Mabo v. 
Queensland, 16 U. N.S.W. L.J. 1, 2 (1993). The title of this paper was a direct challenge to an 
early collection of papers by the University of Queensland Law Journal entitled MABO: A 
JUDICIAL REVOLUTION: THE ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON 
AUSTRALIAN LAW (M.A. Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993). 
 122. Anthony Mason, Putting Mabo in Perspective, 28 AUSTL. LAW. 23 (1993). 
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The notion of a universal common law or customary international 
law has some currency. This section looks at how the Mabo case and 
the principles of native title have been applied in former colonies and 
cited with approval in jurisdictions with existing forms of aboriginal 
title. The relationship to developing human rights and the 
interpretation of positive instruments has underpinned successful 
prosecution of rights in Asia, Southern Africa and South America. 
In 2002, the High Court of Malaysia recognized the land interests 
of the Orang Asli Aboriginal peoples in Sagong Bin Tasi v. 
Government of Malaysia.123 The decision concerned a claim by the 
Temuan tribe of Kuala Langat who had been forcibly removed from 
their territories in order to construct a highway.124 The Court 
overturned earlier jurisprudence, which recognized only usufructuary 
rights.125 In recognizing the rights of the Adong Asli in their 
traditional territories, Justice Mohd Noor Ahmed agreed with Justice 
Brennan in Mabo and stated:  
It is contrary both to international standards and to the 
fundamental values of our common law to entrench a 
discriminatory rule which, because of the supposed position on 
the scale of social organisation of the indigenous inhabitants of 
a settled colony, denies them a right to occupy their traditional 
lands.126 
Justice Mohd Noor Ahmed concluded: “Therefore, in keeping with 
the worldwide recognition now being given to aboriginal rights, I 
conclude that the proprietary interest of the orang asli in their 
customary and ancestral lands is an interest in and to the land.”127 The 
decision was appealed by the government of Malaysia. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge.128  
 123. Sagong Bin Tasi v. Malaysia, [2002] M.L.J. 591. See generally Jerald Gomez, The 
Malaysian Experience, Paper Presented to the Native Title Conference 2002: Outcomes and 
Possibilities, Geraldton, Western Australia (Sept. 3–5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
 124. Sagong Bin Tasi, [2002] M.L.J. at 591. 
 125. Id. at 615; see also Adong bin Kuwan v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor, [1997] M.L.J. 
418. 
 126. Sagong Bin Tasi, [2002] M.L.J. at 615 (citing Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 42). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Malaysia v. Sagong Bin Tasi (unreported judgment, no. 8-02 419-2002, Jun. 14, 
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Similarly, in Alexkor Limited and the Government of South Africa 
v. The Richtersveld Community,129 the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa confirmed the decision of the lower court that the Richtersveld 
community held ownership rights in their territories under indigenous 
law (or customary law) that survived the annexation of those 
territories.130 The Court held that grants of interests in the land to 
others was racially discriminatory, and therefore open to a claim for 
restitution under the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994.131 The 
lower court had relied extensively on comparative common law of 
Australia, Canada and the Privy Council.132 While distinguishing the 
constitutional position of South Africa, the Constitutional Court 
acknowledged the relevance of overseas comparative law and 
accepted the lower court’s findings.133 However, the Court took the 
further step of finding that as a result of the recognition of customary 
law in the Constitution, Indigenous law forms part of the law of 
South Africa and should not be viewed through the lens of the 
common law.134 
In his second edition of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 
James Anaya traced the re-emergences of customary international 
law in relation to the treatment of Indigenous peoples.135 He 
suggested that “customary international norms take shape around a 
certain consensus of what counts as legitimate in relation to 
Indigenous peoples,” while the specific contours are still evolving.136 
These customary norms are reinforced by conforming domestic law 
and practice, including judicial action in cases such as Mabo.137  
2005). 
 129. Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. 2003 Case CCT 19/03 (unreported judgment, Oct. 
14, 2003) ¶ 84, at 41 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/
758.PDF. 
 130. Id. ¶ 103, at 50-51. 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Richtersveld Cmty. v. Alexkor Ltd. 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 133. Alexkor Ltd., Case CCT 19/03 ¶ 84, at 41, available at http://www.constitutionalcourt. 
org.za/Archimages/758.PDF. 
 134. Id. ¶ 51, at 25. The decision in Alexkor is cited with approval by the Malaysian Court 
of Appeal in Malaysia v. Sagong Bin Tasi (unreported judgment, no. 8-02 419-2002, Jun. 14, 
2005). 
 135. ANAYA, supra note 11, at 61–72. 
 136. Id. at 72. 
 137. Id. at 72, 199. 
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The use of these developing customary norms to inform the 
interpretation of multilateral human rights instruments and domestic 
constitutions was adopted in Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.138 In 
upholding the claim of the Awas Tingni to their proprietary rights in 
their traditional territories, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights pointed to the “evolutionary interpretation of international 
instruments for the protection of human rights.”139 The Court used 
this principle to interpret the right to property under Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights 1969 as extending to 
Indigenous communities.140 The Court observed: 
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the 
right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of 
indigenous people with the land must be recognized and 
understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their 
spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For 
indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a 
matter of possession and production but a material and 
spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve 
their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.141 
It continued: 
Indigenous peoples’ customary law must be especially taken 
into account for the purpose of this analysis. As a result of 
customary practices, possession of the land should suffice for 
indigenous communities lacking real title to property of the 
 138. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). In that case, the people of Awas Tingni brought an action before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights to protect their territories from the Nicaraguan 
government’s grant of logging concessions and sought recognition of their proprietary rights in 
their territories. Id. The people of Awas Tingni sought a declaration that the State must establish 
a process for the demarcation of Indigenous property rights, the cessation of grants over natural 
resources until community land tenure had been resolved, and compensation for damages 
suffered by the Community. Id. at 2–4. See generally S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, 
The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous 
Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002). 
 139. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 148, at 79. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. ¶ 149, at 79. 
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land to obtain official recognition of that property, and for 
consequent registration.142 
 Anaya noted that the Mabo decision, while exemplifying the use 
of international standards in the application of domestic rules, bows 
to political considerations and judicial incompetence.143 Anaya 
pointed to the doctrine of extinguishment, established in Mabo, as 
falling short of the aspirations of Indigenous peoples and 
contemporary international norms.144  
Drawing on the jurisprudence of Mabo, Chief Justice Lamer of the 
Supreme Court of Canada spoke of aboriginal title as a reconciliation 
of prior occupation by Indigenous peoples with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty.145 As such, Lamer suggested that courts must 
take into account both perspectives and accord due weight to 
Indigenous perspectives.146 But the fundamental compromise of 
Indigenous rights maintains its place at the center of the doctrine.  
The High Court in Fejo v. Northern Territory of Australia147 
rebuffed the perceived over-reliance on overseas precedents. All of 
the judgments in this case argued that decisions in other common law 
jurisdictions could offer little guidance to the High Court because the 
legal, political and historical considerations were so markedly 
different.148 For Justice Kirby, the belated recognition of native title 
in Australia was seen as a significant factor which negated the value 
of overseas authority.149 Again, this approach is disappointing in that 
it suggests that our own political and legal history provides an excuse 
for a limited response to the claims of Indigenous peoples. 
Absent this reference to overseas jurisprudence, the Australian 
judiciary has developed the doctrine of native title in ways that have 
limited its effectiveness for the recognition of Indigenous interests in 
their territories. The aspect of the decision that is often lauded—the 
acknowledgement of the role of Indigenous law and custom in 
 142. Id. ¶ 151, at 80. 
 143. ANAYA, supra note 11, at 197. 
 144. Id. at 198–99. 
 145. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.R. 1010. 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 81–82; R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507, ¶¶ 42, 49–50. 
 147. Fejo v. N. Terr. of Austl. (1998) 156 A.L.R. 721, 740. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 756, 760. 
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defining the source and the content of the title—has become a 
significant concern in its application to the standards of proof.  
The following sections address in some detail the way in which 
the Australian courts have narrowed the legal scope of native title 
through the nature of the proof required and the extent of 
extinguishment. This examination reveals the fundamental 
contradictions that the compromise of Indigenous rights has caused 
for Australian jurisprudence. 
V. THE SOURCE OF NATIVE TITLE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS: YORTA 
YORTA AND THE NOTION OF INDIGENOUS “SOCIETY” 
The High Court’s decision in Mabo determined that Indigenous 
peoples in Australia may hold rights under their own laws and 
customs and that those rights, in relation to land at least, should be 
accommodated within the Australian legal system. The device used to 
provide recognition of those rights is now known as native title: 
“[I]nterests and rights of Indigenous inhabitants in law, whether 
communal, group or individual, possessed under the traditional laws 
acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the 
[I]ndigenous inhabitants.”150 
The Court immediately drew a distinction between the source of 
the rights asserted and the source of the protection being provided: 
“Native title, though recognized by the common law, is not an 
institution of the common law . . . .”151 Instead: 
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the 
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The 
nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a 
matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs.152 
 150. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 57. The term “native title” now used in 
Australia was adopted by Justice Brennan (and later incorporated into the Native Title Act, 
1993) from Amodu Tijani v. Sec'y, S. Nig., [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.). 
 151. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 59. 
 152. Id. at 58. Justices Deane and Gaudron similarly observed that “the content . . . will of 
course, vary according to the extent of the pre-existing interest of the relevant individual, group 
or community.” Id. at 88. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/14
p225 Strelein book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From Mabo to Yorta Yorta 251 
 
 
 
The title was described as sui generis, or unique, because it reflected 
the rights and entitlements of Indigenous peoples under their own 
laws.153 To characterize native title in this way was an explicit 
acknowledgment that native title should not be understood by 
reference to common law property rights.  
In Western Australia v. Ward,154 the High Court held that the 
Native Title Act of 1993 (“NTA”), not the common law, must be the 
starting point of any investigation of native title.155 The High Court 
has since reiterated that it is the NTA that regulates the 
determination, protection and extinguishment of native title where an 
application for a determination under the NTA is lodged.156 Thus, 
section 223 of the NTA determines the nature of the inquiry. Section 
223 defines native title in similar terms as those stated by the High 
Court in Mabo. Section 223 states: 
(1) [T]he expression native title or native title rights and 
interests means the communal, group or individual rights and 
interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in 
relation to land or waters, where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional 
laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by 
the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and 
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those 
laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters; 
and 
 153. The preamble to the Native Title Act states that “the common law of Australia 
recognises a form of native title that reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants of 
Australia, in accordance with their laws and customs, to their traditional lands.” Native Title 
Act, 1993, Preamble. The primary object of the Act is stated in section 3(1) as “to provide for 
the recognition and protection of native title.” Id. § 3(1). 
 154. W. Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 A.L.R. 1. 
 155. Id. at 16. 
 156. Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538, 549. Indigenous 
peoples are not required to seek a formal determination of native title under the Act. They may 
instead rely on the existence of their title under the common law. However, most have chosen 
to pursue a determination under the Native Title Act because of the procedural notification and 
negotiation rights available to registered applicants and because of the perception of actively 
asserting their rights and their title. Registered applicants may also enter into binding 
agreements that will stand regardless of the eventual outcome of the determination process. 
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(c) the rights and interests are recognized [sic] by the common 
law of Australia.157 
The High Court has determined that this section requires two 
separate inquiries.158 First, the native group must identify traditional 
laws and customs and translate those laws and customs into 
protectable rights and interests.159 The Court has acknowledged the 
difficulty of this translation, but has insisted that it is required by the 
NTA.160 
Second, the evidence must demonstrate the connection to land 
through those laws and customs.161 The High Court has confirmed 
that “connection” in section 223(1)(b) does not require a physical 
connection.162 Moreover, the inquiry is not directed to how 
Indigenous peoples use or occupy the land.163 Therefore, absence of 
recent evidence does not lead to the conclusion that there is no 
relevant connection.164  
The standards of proof outlined in Ward were further developed 
by the High Court shortly thereafter in Members of the Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v. Victoria.165 The appeal was taken from one 
of the most controversial native title determinations to date. At trial, 
Justice Olney denied the claim by the Yorta Yorta people based on 
the conclusion that “the tide of history” had washed away any real 
acknowledgement of the traditional laws and customs that were 
important to the original inhabitant at the time of settlement.166 
Despite petitions to the Crown for the protection of their lands, 
Justice Olney considered several factors affecting the Yorta Yorta 
when making his decision. First, Olney considered the forced 
settlement on missions within Yorta Yorta’s traditional territories.167 
 157. Native Title Act, 1993, § 223(1); see also Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 58–59, 69.  
 158. W. Australia, 191 A.L.R. ¶ 18, at 17, applied by the Full Federal Court in De Rose v. 
S. Australia [2002] F.C.A. 1342, ¶ 160 (Nov. 1, 2002). 
 159. W. Australia, 191 A.L.R. ¶ 18, at 17. 
 160. Id. ¶ 14, at 15. 
 161. Id. ¶ 18, at 17. 
 162. Id. ¶ 64, at 32. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria [1998] F.C.A. 1606 (Dec. 18, 1998). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. ¶¶ 36–49. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/14
p225 Strelein book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From Mabo to Yorta Yorta 253 
 
 
 
Second, Olney examined the suppression of language and old forms 
of cultural expression.168 Finally, Olney considered the taking up of 
paid employment to admit a “settling down to more orderly habits of 
industry.”169 From this evidence, Olney determined that by 1881, a 
mere forty years after settlement of the area, the Yorta Yorta had lost 
their culture and their status as a “traditional society.”170 
The High Court confirmed that the rights and interests protected 
by native title are recognized by Australian law; however, the Court 
concluded that they have their source in the law of the Indigenous 
society.171 The High Court expressed this by establishing that the 
laws and customs relied upon are part of a normative system, based 
on a set of rules with “normative content.”172 In legal terms, this 
means that they must be more than merely “observable patterns of 
behaviour.”173 
However, giving primacy to the NTA, the majority of the Court 
suggested that the construction of section 223 requires a different 
conception of tradition than would be suggested by the ordinary 
meaning of the word.174 While the majority agreed that “tradition[]” 
means the transmission of law or custom from generation to 
generation, usually by word of mouth and common practice, they 
argued that in the context of the NTA, more was required.175  
First, the Court suggested that the NTA conveys an understanding 
of the age of the traditions; that is, the source of the rights and 
interests must be found in normative rules that existed prior to the 
assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.176 Second, the Court 
suggested that the present tense language of the provisions requires 
that the normative system has had a continuous existence and vitality 
 168. Id. ¶ 118. 
 169. Id. ¶¶ 119–20 (referring to the 1881 Petition to the Governor General of New South 
Wales signed by forty-two residents of Maloga Mission who requested that lands be reserved 
for them so that they could “support [them]selves by [their] own industry;” rather than as 
evidence of the ongoing struggle for the return of lands, as it was urged by the applicants, it was 
adjudged evidence of abandonment of laws and customs). 
 170. Id. ¶ 129. 
 171. Yorta Yorta Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538, ¶ 33, at 549. 
 172. Id. ¶ 38, at 550. 
 173. Id. ¶ 42, at 551. 
 174. Id. ¶¶ 46–47, at 552–53. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
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since sovereignty.177 The continued existence of this system, it was 
argued, depends on its maintenance and observance by the group who 
has bound itself to it.178 In this sense, the Court suggested, the 
maintenance of the normative system defines the society.179 The 
Court was careful not to require a continuous tracing of activities or 
rights and interests to pre-contact times; instead, it is the “body of 
law” that must have continued.180 The content of that body of law 
may undergo evolution and development, but it must not suffer 
substantial interruption.181 
The Court stated quite frankly that the “difficulty of the forensic 
task which may confront claimants does not alter the requirements of 
the statutory provision.”182 It accepted that claimants may invite the 
Court to infer from the evidence that the content of the traditional 
laws and customs of earlier times is rooted in the pre-sovereignty 
normative system.183 However, the Court noted that the more 
restricted evidentiary rules introduced by the Native Title 
Amendment Act in 1998 may make such inferences more difficult 
than under the previous provisions.184 
 177. Id. ¶ 47, at 553. The High Court’s reasoning in W. Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 
A.L.R. 1, 32, suggested that abandonment is not a form of common law extinguishment outside 
of the Native Title Act. That is, native title can not be extinguished contrary to the Act. 
Abandonment is not a basis for extinguishment contemplated in the Act and cannot be 
introduced through reference to the definition of native title in section 223, which requires that 
native title be “recognised by the common law.” Native Title Act, 1993, § 223(1)(c). This was 
confirmed in Yorta Yorta, 194 A.L.R. ¶ 90, at 563. 
 178. Yorta Yorta, 194 A.L.R. ¶ 50, at 554. 
 179. Id. ¶¶ 47–48, at 553. 
 180. Id. ¶ 50, at 554. 
 181. From the Mabo case and since, the High Court has firmly stated that it does not expect 
that the laws and customs that sustain native title will be frozen in time or reflect some arcane 
notion of being “traditional” as reflecting pre-contact activities. It was accepted that native title 
rights and interests are regulated by law and custom internal to the group and that such interests 
change and evolve as the society changes. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 110, 
192. In Yorta Yorta, the High Court confirmed that some change to or adaptation of the system 
of law and custom or interruption in the enjoyment of native title rights and interests will not 
“necessarily” be fatal to the claim, but in a particular case they may take on considerable 
significance. Yorta Yorta, 194 A.L.R. ¶¶ 83, 87, 89, at 562–63. Compare the dissenting 
judgment of Justices Gaudron and Kirby, who rejected the requirement that connection be 
“substantially maintained,” suggesting that this term finds no expression in the Native Title Act. 
Id. ¶ 109, at 567–68. 
 182. Yorta Yorta, 194 A.L.R. ¶ 80, at 561. 
 183. Id. ¶¶ 77, 80, at 559, 561. 
 184. Id. ¶ 81, at 562. 
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In determining that the Yorta Yorta no longer observed the same 
normative system that “burdened” the Crown’s acquisition of 
sovereignty, the High Court held that the Yorta Yorta who came to 
the Court to assert native title were in fact a different society to that 
which had originally held native title.185 The Court deferred to the 
judgment of the trial judge, holding that it was open to Justice Olney 
to determine on the facts that there had been a significant disruption 
in the system of law and custom that sustained native title.186 Thus, 
the Court found that the claimant group was not bound by the same 
normative system that existed at the assertion of British sovereignty, 
and the members were not, therefore, holders of native title.187 
The Court determined that native title recognizes the intersection 
of two bodies of law—that of the prior sovereignty and that of the 
new sovereign.188 However, the Court explained that only the 
normative system in existence prior to the assertion of British 
sovereignty could create rights and interests.189 Thus, the body of law 
and custom before the Court in a native title application must have its 
roots in that pre-existing system.190  
In Yorta Yorta, the Court introduced a logical disjunction into the 
doctrine of native title that creates a schism between the existence of 
Indigenous law and the legal consequences thereof. The Court 
surmised that native title rights must find their source in traditional 
law and custom. However, because the introduction of a new legal 
order denied the efficacy of any parallel law making system, the 
rights and interests claimed must have been brought into existence 
when the normative society now claiming native title was able to 
validly create new rights, interests and duties. Rights and interests 
created by a society coming into existence after the assertion of 
sovereignty that were not recognized by the common law and were 
not sourced in the new legal order could not be given legal effect.191  
 185. Id. ¶ 95, at 564. 
 186. Id. ¶ 94, at 564. 
 187. Id. ¶¶ 95–96, at 564–65. 
 188. Id. ¶ 31, at 548–49. 
 189. Id. ¶ 43, at 552. 
 190. Id. ¶ 38, at 550. 
 191. Id. ¶¶ 43–44, at 552.  
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By requiring proof of continued acknowledgement of a system of 
laws as a precondition for the recognition of native title, the Court 
has disavowed any continuing authority within Indigenous societies 
capable of recognition by the courts. The Court relied on the act of 
state doctrine to reassert that the acquisition of sovereignty cannot be 
challenged by a municipal court.192 This abdication of judicial 
responsibility was exacerbated by the Court’s adherence to the 
suggestion that it is the NTA which limits the ability to recognize 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands, and that there is no 
continuing role for the common law in determining the underlying 
concepts or proper interpretation of the NTA.193 
A large part of the problem in Yorta Yorta still lies with the 
assessments of Justice Olney. His Honor concentrated on the 
discontinuity with the expansion of settlement of practices and 
traditions of the group in terms of economic and other lifestyle 
changes, and he discounted the continuity of social relations and 
responsibility for land.194 Even before the High Court’s decision in 
Yorta Yorta, similar conclusions had been reached by Justice 
O’Loughlin in De Rose v. South Australia.195 The decision in De 
Rose concerned pastoral property in the far northwest section of 
South Australia. A group of Aboriginal people asserted native title 
over the area as Nguraritja, or traditional owners, of the land.196 
 192. Id. ¶ 37, at 551. 
 193. Id. ¶ 75, at 560. Justice McHugh, in dissent, questioned this reasoning, stating that he 
was “unconvinced that the construction that this court has placed on § 223 accords with what 
the parliament intended.” Id. ¶ 129, at 572. 
 194. Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria [1998] F.C.A. 1606 (Dec. 18, 1998). For 
example, taking up paid employment and participating in the local pastoral industry was seen as 
evidence of a rejection of traditional society. Id. ¶¶ 34, 45–46, 120. Contemporary practices of 
cultural heritage protection and environmental management were not seen as continuity of 
tradition, but as new traditions of a differently constituted Yorta Yorta society. Id. ¶¶ 121–25; 
see also Lisa Strelein, Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community: Comment, 2 LAND 
RTS. L.: ISSUES NATIVE TITLE 21 (2003). 
 195. De Rose v. S. Australia [2002] F.C.A. 1342, ¶ 106 (Nov. 1, 2002). 
 196. Id. ¶ 37. The applicants sought a determination of native title based on their status as 
Nguraritja. Id. Many applicants referred to themselves as Yunkunytjatjara; others referred to 
themselves, or to their parents, as Pitjantjatajra, or Antikirinya. Id. ¶ 31. Evidence of the 
Aboriginal witnesses that the claimed area fell within Yunkunytjatjara country was accepted. 
Id. The claimant group is part of the Western Desert society and follows the laws and customs 
of the broader community. 
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At the trial level, Justice O’Loughlin determined that any physical 
or spiritual connection to the land by the applicants had been 
abandoned and had led to a breakdown in the observance of 
traditional customs that was fatal to their application.197 The decision 
was alarming because of the applicants’ presence on the property up 
until relatively recently and because of their strong acknowledgment 
of law, customs and language of the Western Desert.198 
In part, like Justice Olney, Justice O’Loughlin overemphasized 
the spiritual and cultural elements of Indigenous society over the 
more mundane economic and social relations. His Honor judged the 
connection of many of the claimants to the area as primarily for 
employment.199 As a corollary, it was work and education that took 
individuals away from the area. These were said to be decisions 
based on “non-aboriginal factors.”200 Again like Justice Olney, 
Justice O’Loughlin made his own assessment about whether the 
community had done enough to maintain its right to the land. 
Justice O’Loughlin’s decision was overturned on appeal.201 The 
Full Federal Court was critical of Justice O’Loughlin in making his 
own judgments about whether individuals had maintained rights 
based on his personal assessment of their compliance with traditional 
law.202 The Full Federal Court held that this was in fact a matter for 
the traditional laws and customs to determine internally within the 
group.203 The applicants were not required to show that they 
constituted a discrete society.204 The Western Desert Bloc was the 
normative system upon which the claim could successfully be 
 197. Id. ¶ 911. 
 198. Id. ¶¶ 898–900. 
 199. Id. ¶ 902. 
 200. Id. ¶ 681. 
 201. De Rose v. S. Australia (2003) 133 F.C.R. 286. While the trial judge was found to 
have erred in law, the full court was unable to make a positive determination of native title 
without further arguments and/or evidence. A final determination was handed down in June 
2005, recognizing native title. De Rose v. S. Australia II [2005] F.C.A. 110 (Jun. 8, 2005). 
 202. Distinguishing this case from Yorta Yorta, the full court pointed to the broader system 
of Western Desert law as constituting the society to which the claimants belonged. De Rose, 
133 F.C.R. ¶ 313. This normative system had continued uninterrupted and it was this law that 
was to determine whether individual Nguraritja had exercised their responsibilities and 
maintained their interest in the area. 
 203. Id. ¶ 315. 
 204. Id. ¶ 275–76. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p225 Strelein book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:225 
 
 
 
founded.205 It existed at the time of sovereignty and its traditional 
laws and customs had continued substantially uninterrupted 
throughout the period.206 
Yorta Yorta leaves us with the problem of determining the line at 
which the courts will recognize that traditions may evolve, but 
nonetheless take the view that the fundamental structure of the 
normative system has become so affected, or interrupted, that native 
title is destroyed. In its application, it appears that the definition of 
the community in Yorta Yorta based on the operation of a body of 
law and custom, rather than on the specific rights and interests or 
activities over land, provides a degree of flexibility in the way that 
groups are determined for the purposes of recognizing native title.  
Despite repeated objections from respondent parties, various 
conglomerate groups have been accepted in a large number of 
determinations under the NTA. In the recent determination regarding 
the Wanjina-Wunggurr community, Justice Sundberg was not 
concerned that the idea of a Wanjina-Wunggurr community may be 
an anthropological construct or of recent origin, and accepted that it 
need not even be a term used by the claimants themselves.207 While 
the claimants identify as Ngarinyin, Worrorra and Wunambul, and by 
their Dambun (clan) relationships, they also clearly articulate the 
extent of the society with which they share a system of law and 
custom, particularly in relation to land. This is the extent of the 
Wanjina-Wunggurr community.  
Justice Sundberg pointed to the reasoning of the High Court and 
of the lower courts in Ward as an example where the courts accepted 
the Miriuwung Gajerrong community as the appropriate native title 
holding group, despite the development of a closer association 
between the two groups post contact and in recent times.208  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. ¶¶ 275–82. 
 207. Neowarra v. W. Australia [2003] F.C.A. 1402, ¶ 395 (Dec. 8, 2003). 
 208. Variations on this theme include Hayes v. Northern Territory (1999) 97 F.C.R. 32 (the 
Alice Springs determination), in which three estate groups were recognized as holding title; 
Yarmirr v. Northern Territory (1998) 156 A.L.R. 370, in which five clans claimed a communal 
title; and Lardil, Kaiadith, Yangkoal & Gangalidda Peoples v. State of Queensland [2001] 
F.C.A. 414, in which a composite of groups was recognized as sharing laws and customs that 
defined them as a normative society for the purposes of native title. In consent determinations 
over areas also within the Western Desert cultural bloc, the Federal Court has recognized the 
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His Honor rejected the respondents’ contention that the 
acknowledgement of laws and customs had been washed away by the 
impact of European settlement, by the settling of the claimants in 
communities, by the dilution of knowledge about the laws and 
customs, and by lack of enforcement.209 Referring to the High Court’s 
decision in Yorta Yorta, Justice Sunberg held that an interruption to 
exercise of custom is not necessarily fatal to a claim unless the 
interruption is so substantial that it results in the creation or requires 
the re-creation of an altogether different normative society.210 Laws 
and customs need not be “mandatory” in order to be normative. 
Further, a custom does not cease to exist, nor does a person cease to 
be a member of a society if they do not obey the normative rules.211 
Justice Sundberg highlights that it is the possession of rights and 
interests, not the exercise of those rights and interests, that is central 
to the inquiry.212  
Justice Sundberg noted that although he would examine the laws 
and customs individually, the system must be looked at as a whole in 
order to obtain an accurate picture.213 His Honor recognized a 
connection between the laws and customs now acknowledged and 
observed by the claimants and those laws and customs in existence at 
the acquisition of sovereignty, finding that they derive their content 
from the normative system in existence at the time.214 However, 
Justice Sundberg also acknowledged that such a connection may be 
inferred by the Court from the evidence.215  
The proof of a coherent and continuous society defined by a pre-
sovereignty normative system creates an enormous grey area in the 
requirement of proof. The nature of the group has emerged as a 
connection between a number of language/dialect groups who comprise the Martu native title 
group, James v. W. Australia [2002] F.C.A. 1208, and the connection of the “Kiwikurra mob,” 
a group of twenty local descent groups who hold rights and interests primarily within the 
determination area, Brown v. W. Australia [2001] F.C.A. 1462. 
 209. Neowarra, [2003] F.C.A. ¶ 338. 
 210. Id. ¶ 163; see also Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538, 
¶ 82–83. 
 211. His Honor used the example of speed limits in Australian Road Traffic Laws to 
demonstrate this point. Neowarra, [2003] F.C.A. ¶ 310. 
 212. Id. ¶ 40. 
 213. Id. ¶ 162. 
 214. Id. ¶ 335. 
 215. Id. ¶ 38. 
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fundamental threshold question for native title claimants. The High 
Court’s defense of the views of the trial judge in Yorta Yorta 
demonstrates the vagaries of an assessment based to a significant 
degree on the judge’s perceptions of the group. The High Court has 
done little to guide trial judges away from their pre-existing biases 
and prejudices in making such an assessment. Native title claimants 
must rely on the ability of a non-Indigenous judiciary to conceive the 
contemporary expressions of Indigenous identity, culture and law. 
What native title law is able to recognize in terms of rights and 
interests derived from Indigenous society is affected by judicial 
understandings of the relationship between traditional and pre-
colonial society.  
VI. THE PRICE OF RECOGNITION: EXTINGUISHMENT AND THE 
EXERCISE OF CROWN POWER 
The final determination of native title and its pendant rights and 
interests requires more than just the translation of a normative system 
that regulates behavior among a group into a proprietary title 
understandable in the Australian property system. This may, in itself, 
seem a difficult task, but the process is further complicated by the 
associated task of determining the impact of extinguishment. The 
conflation of these two processes in devising a final determination 
has created significant obstacles for the proof of native title and has 
undermined titles in many instances.  
The structure of Australian native title does not replicate the 
Aboriginal rights doctrine of Canada or the domestic dependent 
nation doctrine of the United States, yet all three share a common 
deference to the state’s power to unilaterally extinguish Indigenous 
rights.216 At the same time that the courts recognized Indigenous 
peoples’ rights to land, they also asserted that the state has power to 
divest those rights unilaterally, without consent or recompense. 
Native title, they argued, can be extinguished by a valid exercise of 
 216. Compare Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 68–74, 94–100, 194–95, with 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823). See also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 
(1913); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1914). In Canada, 
compare St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1887] S.C.R. 577, with the 
fiduciary duty doctrine in Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] S.C.R. 335. 
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governmental power that demonstrates a clear and plain intention.217 
This is premised on the notion of an underlying title of the state that 
may be perfected by the exercise of complete dominion.  
The majority of the Mabo judges held that such “acts of state,” 
though adverse to the rights of Indigenous peoples, could not be 
legally wrong.218 The Mabo court held that prior to the introduction 
of the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, the Crown, in right of the 
Commonwealth or of the States, was free to discriminate against 
Indigenous property holders and divest them of rights and interests 
without consent or compensation.219 Despite authority to the contrary, 
the court refused to provide any common law protection for native 
title holders.220 Michael Dodson has criticized these limitations: 
The Mabo decision does not recognize equality of rights or 
equality of entitlement: it recognizes the legal validity of 
Aboriginal title until the white man wants that land . . . For the 
vast majority of Indigenous Australians the Mabo decision is a 
belated act of sterile symbolism. It will not return the country 
of our ancestors, nor will it result in compensation for its 
loss.221 
In the Native Title Act case, the majority of the High Court 
confirmed extinguishment as “a valid exercise of sovereign power 
inconsistent with the continued enjoyment or unimpaired enjoyment 
 217. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 64 (relying on Calder v. Attorney Gen. of B.C., [1973] S.L.R. 
313, 404). 
 218. Id. at 92, 94, 100. Justices Deane and Gaudron initially commented on wrongful 
extinguishment, but reverted to the power of the state. Id. Justice Toohey was the only judge to 
affirm the rights of Indigenous peoples against arbitrary exercise of power by the state. Id. at 
195. The brief judgment of Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh confirmed the ratio of the 
case in this regard. Id. at 15–16. 
 219. Id. at 15–16. Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh purported to “confirm” the 
view of the Court in relation to compensation. 
 220. This aspect of the decision has been criticized for denying Indigenous people’s rights 
that are enjoyed by non-Indigenous interest holders under common law, statute and 
constitutional provisions. See KENT MCNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?: ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS 
RIGHTS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 357–415 (2001). 
 221. Michael Dodson, Statement on Behalf of the Northern Land Council, in THE 
AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION: UN WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, TENTH 
SESSION, GENEVA, JULY 1992, at 35 (1992). 
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of native title.”222 As such, the extent of extinguishment or 
impairment would depend on the extent of any inconsistency. 
This view was reaffirmed by the decision of the High Court in 
Wik Peoples v. Queensland,223 in which the High Court clarified the 
extent to which native title can co-exist with other interests granted or 
with uses by the Crown. There, the court examined the nature of the 
pastoral lease, which is a legislative limited purpose lease, to access 
the extent of inconsistency. The court found that the lease was not 
entirely inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of some elements 
of native title.224 This did not mean that past legislation or 
inconsistent grants were ineffective. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly 
affirmed that where an inconsistency arises, the non-native title 
interests are preferred.225 
Courts have recognized instances in which an interest granted by 
the Crown may be so extensive as to be fundamentally inconsistent 
with the maintenance of the connection that sustains native title, such 
that native title is extinguished. This has been the case in relation to 
freehold or fee simple titles, where the nature of freehold is 
“inconsistent with the native title holders continuing to hold any of 
the rights or interests which together make up native title.”226  
The Fejo court placed the emphasis on an “inherent vulnerability” 
of native title as the basis for determining that native title had been 
extinguished by later Crown grants.227 Indeed, in rejecting any 
possibility of co-existing rights, Justice Kirby stated that “the 
inconsistency lies not in the facts or in the way in which the land is 
actually used. It lies in a comparison between the inherently fragile 
native title right, susceptible to extinguishment or defeasance, and the 
legal rights which fee simple confers.”228 
 222. W. Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373, 439. 
 223. Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 133. 
 226. Fejo v. N. Terr. of Austl. (1998) 156 A.L.R. 721, 736. An estate in fee simple is said 
to be the closest thing to absolute ownership that exists in the Australian system of land tenure, 
by which it allows “every act of ownership which can enter into the imagination.” 
Commonwealth v. New S. Wales (1923) 33 C.L.R. 1, 42. 
 227. Fejo, 156 A.L.R. ¶ 105, at 756. 
 228. Id.  
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The idea of such an “inherent vulnerability” in native title was an 
undercurrent of previous judgments. In Mabo, for example, Justice 
Brennan observed that, by the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown, 
“rights and interests in land that may have been indefeasible under 
the old regime become liable to extinction by exercise of the new 
sovereign power.”229 Similarly, Justices Deane and Gaudron argued 
that native title could be extinguished by an exercise of sovereign 
powers in a manner inconsistent with native title.230 However, 
Justices Deane and Gaudron claimed that native title was not 
protected against impairment by subsequent grant, which was unlike 
an earlier title emerging from the non-indigenous tenure system.231  
The NTA and the Native Title Amendment Act of 1998 
(“NTAA”) have undeniably played a role in shaping the 
extinguishment of native title. The High Court’s decision in Ward 
confirms that recognition by the NTA may cease where, as a matter 
of law, native title has been extinguished. This is true even where the 
facts of Indigenous peoples’ continued rights and interests in relation 
to land would continue under Indigenous law. The NTA’s validation 
provisions cast no doubt as to the validity of past acts. The NTA was 
introduced in response to the Mabo decision. Like the Mabo decision 
itself, the NTA contained a number of compromises of native title in 
favor of other interests. Yet, many argued that it provided a number 
of advantages over reliance on the common law.  
The NTA declares that native title is recognized and protected 
according to the Act and cannot be extinguished except according to 
the procedures set out in the Act.232 But, the courts had already placed 
native title at the lowest point in the hierarchy of rights and interest 
under common law, saved only, to a limited extent, by the RDA.233 
 229. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 63. The Court specifically foreshadowed 
extinguishment by freehold grant. Id. at 89, 110; see also W. Australia, 183 C.L.R. at 422; Wik 
Peoples, 187 C.L.R. at 176, 250. 
 230. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 94–100. 
 231. Id. at 89. 
 232. See Native Title Act, 1993, §§ 10–11. 
 233. Mabo v. Queensland I (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186. Under the common law, the date of the 
introduction of the RDA had a significant impact upon the validity of certain acts. From that 
date, just terms provisions for the compulsory acquisition of property by government were said 
to apply equally to native title. 
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Thus, the NTA reinforced and built upon discriminatory aspects of 
the common law. 
The courts have made it clear that the NTA creates a detailed and 
technical regime of statutory extinguishment.234 The fundamental 
compromise of Indigenous rights by the courts was built upon in the 
1993 NTA, which validated titles issued between the introduction of 
the RDA and the articulation of the law of native title in Mabo by 
suspending or overriding the operation of the RDA.235 The 1998 
amendments went further, creating a number of new categories of 
valid acts to which the RDA would not apply.236 While confirming 
the validity of these acts, Commonwealth and state governments 
remained liable for compensation.237  
The High Court in Ward concentrated on the complex web of 
statutes that now frames native title and tried to articulate the process 
for determining the relationship between native title and other 
interests. The Court concentrated on the intricacies of determining the 
extinguishing effects of two hundred years of dealing with 
Indigenous peoples’ land without consideration of their property 
rights. They confirmed that prior grants and interests could extinguish 
native title in part, thereby extracting particular rights and interests 
from native title permanently. The patchwork of tenures granted over 
land throughout Australia’s history, therefore, leaves a permanent 
 234. W. Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 A.L.R. 1; Erebum Le (Darnley Islanders) 1 v. 
Queensland [2003] F.C.A. 227 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
 235. Native Title Act, 1993, § 7(3). 
 236. Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 [hereinafter NTAA]. Among the aims of the 
amendments were to validate further titles issued in contravention of the 1993 Act, and to 
legally confirm the extinguishment of native title by various acts and reservations. Many of 
these concessions have gone beyond the compromises found in the common law, further 
impacting on native title, and have required the state to establish compensatory provisions. 
Previous exclusive possession acts (section 23B), previous non-exclusive possession acts 
(section 23F), and intermediate period acts (section 232) were introduced alongside the existing 
provisions relating to past and future acts (sections 228 and 233, respectively). The NTAA 
confirmed and, in some instances, extended this complete extinguishment through specific 
provisions; for example, with respect to public works, or in relation to prescribed interests 
contained in Schedule 1 of the NTA. Darnley Islanders, [2003] F.C.A. 227. 
 237. Specific provisions for determining compensation are contained in the NTA. Native 
Title Act, 1993, § 51. The NTA also provides for non-monetary compensation, including 
transfer of property or provision of goods and services. Id. § 51(b). Section 51A, however, 
seeks to limit compensation to freehold value. Id. § 51A. 
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imprint on native title that cannot be removed unless statutory 
provision is made. 
Thus, the native title doctrine establishes a hierarchical 
relationship between Indigenous interests and the interests of others 
and re-introduces an element of dependency of Indigenous rights on 
the good will of the state.238 The courts, as a matter of policy, chose 
to subordinate the rights of Indigenous peoples to other interests as a 
matter of expediency, even limiting the availability of compensation 
for the damage caused by past acts and policies. The courts have 
relied on the source of the rights, as emerging from Indigenous 
society, as the source of vulnerability.  
The selective use of native title to reinforce its susceptibility to 
extinguishment is a disappointing aspect of the doctrine of native 
title. While recognizing that native title has its origins in, and is given 
its content by, the laws of Indigenous peoples, the judgments of the 
courts nonetheless have continually undermined the status of those 
laws. While reaffirming that native title is neither an institution of the 
common law nor a form of common law title, the courts affirm that 
while the existence of Indigenous law is necessary to establish native 
title, it is not sufficient. 
The existence of land rights under Indigenous law will not be 
enough to receive recognition under the common law. The High 
Court dismissed any claim to the revival of native title that seeks “to 
convert the fact of continued connection with the land into [a] right to 
maintain that connection.”239 The Court’s decision with regard to 
revival combines with the reasoning of the judgments concerning 
inconsistency to ensure that native title must fit within the cracks left 
by the Australian land tenure system to be enforceable under the 
common law. 
In Ward, the Court required even greater detail of Indigenous 
peoples’ land laws and customs to establish the rights and interests 
conferred by native title. In doing so, the Court implicitly, and often 
explicitly, recognized that Indigenous peoples have a sphere of 
authority to make laws with respect to their relationship with land. 
 238. See Macklem, supra note 46. 
 239. Ward, 191 A.L.R. ¶ 627 (citing Fejo v. N. Terr. of Austl. (1998) 156 A.L.R. 721, 
¶ 46). 
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Yet, the courts have been quick to undermine that authority by 
readily imputing extinguishment of any native title right to make 
decisions with respect to access and use.  
Even where the court has found the elements of proof of title 
satisfied, the extinguishment doctrine has served to undermine the 
nature of that title. In Neowarra v. State of Western Australia,240 
Justice Sundberg suggested that to determine the rights “possessed 
under their traditional laws and customs” under section 223(1)(a), the 
laws must be looked at from the Indigenous perspective.241 His Honor 
found that the claimants possessed what they would describe as the 
right to speak for country, to control access, or to own or rule the 
land. Sundberg found that the evidence sustained a claim to 
“possession, occupation, use and enjoyment to the exclusion of all 
others.”242 His Honor noted that the claims were not disputed by any 
other Indigenous group, and indeed were supported by witnesses 
from neighboring groups.243 His Honor held that this would be 
sufficient to meet the requirements of the NTA where extinguishment 
was not an issue.244 Unless the evidence established a more “modest 
collection of rights and interests,” it was unnecessary to articulate the 
rights and interests encompassed by that broad right of ownership to 
any greater level of particularity.245  
Despite the recognition that traditional laws of the Wanjina-
Wunggurr region translated broadly into native title rights and 
interests, Justice Sundberg suggested that the comprehensive right 
would need to be “unbundled” into its component parts to determine 
the impact of extinguishment.246 The applicants had argued that with 
this underlying recognition of exclusive possession the most 
 240. Neowarra v. W. Australia [2003] F.C.A. 1402. 
 241. Id. ¶ 364. 
 242. Id. ¶ 380. 
 243. Id. ¶ 379. 
 244. Id. ¶ 380. Section 225(b) of the NTA sets out the requirements of a determination. 
Referring to the applicability of the form of the order in Mabo v. Queensland II (1992), 175 
C.L.R. 1, Justice Sundberg suggested that even in Ward, 191 A.L.R. 1, the High Court had 
accepted that absent extinguishing acts, the trial judge’s finding of exclusive possession would 
have been sufficiently described by the form “possession, occupation, use and enjoyment.” 
Neowarra, [2003] F.C.A. ¶¶ 380–82. 
 245. Neowarra, [2003] F.C.A. ¶ 380. 
 246. Id. ¶ 382. 
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appropriate way to determine the impact of extinguishment was by 
what I would describe as an “exclusive possession—minus” 
methodology. That is, the exclusive possession title is reduced by the 
extent of the interests granted. Under this methodology the court 
would assess the rights and interests conferred by the non-indigenous 
interest and the native title would be extinguished only to the extent 
necessary to give effect to those rights. 
Further, the laws and customs relied upon by the native title 
holders in establishing their claim would be exercisable subject to the 
rights of the interest holder. Justice Sunberg rejected the notion of 
what he called “conditional rights” based on the decisions of the High 
Court in Ward and Yarmirr.247 His Honor favored a direct 
comparison of each law and the rights it confers against the rights 
already conferred. As a result, as demonstrated in Ward and in later 
determinations, the grant of any interest in the land, by taking away 
the “exclusivity” of the title, denies any ongoing role of the native 
title holders to make decisions in relation to access and use of their 
country.  
The result of the extinguishing impact of pastoral leases in the 
area is that the Indigenous peoples’ rights in relation to large tracts of 
land are limited to general access hunting and fishing rights for 
personal communal or ceremonial and non-commercial use. Because 
the relationship with traditional law and custom is so tenuous under 
such an exercise, the judge took the advice of the High Court in Ward 
and resorted to a consideration of the kinds of activities that could be 
exercised in pursuit of the native title. These activities, it was said, do 
not define the legal content of the right, but nevertheless express the 
relationship between native title and the other interests in the area. 
Such invasive extinguishment is not necessary to give effect to the 
limited rights encompassed by many of these interests, and 
unnecessarily entrenches upon the rights of the native title holders.  
 247. Id. ¶ 475. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Australian courts and the legislature have been compliant in 
the subjugation of native title to the interests of the Crown and to 
private interests. Nevertheless, the Mabo decision set a benchmark 
for recognition, even though it may not have met its potential or the 
expectations of Indigenous peoples. However, the Mabo decision still 
provides an unprecedented level of protection over Indigenous land 
rights that is binding on the state—the courts, the legislature and the 
executive—as well as on its grantees. 
While alternative approaches exist within the common law for the 
recognition and accommodation of Indigenous peoples’ laws and 
rights over their territories, the inconsistencies and hierarchies that 
characterize these approaches suggest that a novel approach is 
needed.248 Australian courts are faced with an interesting route for the 
future. In recognizing the prior sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, 
they have undermined the discovery doctrine and the settlement 
thesis. Moreover, in recognizing the continuing rights, laws and 
authority of Indigenous peoples, the courts have identified a sphere of 
authority that can legitimately be claimed to be sovereign. The 
foundations exist in the Mabo decision for an accommodation of the 
self-determination claims of Indigenous peoples in a way that 
respects their distinct identity and authority as peoples. 
However, the inconsistent treatment of the theory of Indigenous 
rights has meant that Indigenous sovereignty is excluded from the 
scope of rights that can be claimed before the courts. While the tenor 
of recent judgments appears respectful of Indigenous peoples, the law 
they set down still contains vestiges of the assumptions of 
superiority. The requirements of proof of social organization and 
traditional connection since the assertion of sovereignty, as well as 
the emphasis on tenure history and extinguishment, are all examples 
of the way in which the law has subordinated Indigenous society. An 
 248. For example, though many commentators have proposed the domestic dependent 
nation model set forth in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), this model has been 
described by Thomas Flanagan as an “uneasy compromise” between the Indigenous peoples 
view of themselves as sovereign peoples and the colonial view of them as “uncivilized 
populations subject to the imposed sovereignty of colonising powers.” Flanagan, supra note 46, 
at 84. 
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approach that begins from the premise that all peoples are equal, and 
that their rights are worthy of protection against the excesses of the 
state, would produce a different result.  
Illustrating the commonality of the Indigenous experience in 
common law countries, Robert Williams Jr. lamented that “legal 
doctrines . . . continue to be asserted today to deny respect to the 
Indian’s vision and to assert its truths in a world which has not yet 
learned that freedom is built [sic] on my respect for my brother’s 
vision and his respect for mine.”249 
The common law has been responsible for inculcating the policies 
of the state and has perpetuated injustices against Indigenous peoples 
in Australia and throughout the common law world. Michael Dodson 
observed that “the machinery of the Australian legal system has acted 
as the legitimising arm of colonialism.”250 This criticism was echoed 
in the United States by Robert Williams, Jr.: “For the native peoples 
of the United States, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand . . . the end of the history of their colonization begins by 
denying the legitimacy of and respect for the rule of law maintained 
by the racist discourse of conquest of the Doctrine of Discovery.”251 
Through legal fictions, such as terra nullius and the doctrine of 
discovery, the courts have unquestioningly adhered to assertions of 
sole sovereignty and superiority by the more powerful colonizing 
state. These assumptions are also reflected in the construction of 
specific doctrines of Indigenous peoples’ rights, such as that of native 
title.  
Both American and British courts created legal fictions to justify 
state acts in assuming sovereignty of Indigenous peoples and their 
lands. Chief Justice Marshall was frank in admitting that the 
compromise doctrine promulgated by his decisions in the Cherokee 
cases was based more on political expediency and the policy needs of 
the state than on the notions of justice or human rights, or indeed on 
 249. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 
219, 298–99 (1986). 
 250. Michael Dodson, From Lore to Law: Indigenous Rights and Australian Legal 
Systems, ABORIGINAL L. BULL., Feb. 1995, at 2.  
 251. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 325.  
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the facts.252 These same compromises have been reached in the 
emerging common law of native title in Australia. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the recognition of common 
law native title rights, the courts continue to assume the inferiority of 
Indigenous sovereignty and of Aboriginal law.253 Future claims 
asserting greater self-determination goals cannot rely solely on the 
development of a doctrine of native title, the foundations of which 
reassert inequality. Future claims must question the legitimacy of the 
hierarchical relationship built into native title, and the entrenched 
position of the Crown’s authority. Otherwise, the result, as we have 
seen in the domestic dependent nation doctrine, is simply to 
“reproduce the dependency in a new form.”254  
With the retention of the original settlement thesis for all but title 
to land, the test of social organization remains the foundation of 
Australian sovereignty. Paul Patton has argued that because of the 
failure to consider issues of sovereignty directly, the “hierarchy of 
cultures and powers established at colonisation remains essentially 
intact.”255 The doctrine of native title artificially separates issues 
relating to land title from other aspects of Indigenous society. 
Michael Dodson criticized this aspect of the doctrine, as established 
in the Mabo decision, saying that “[t]he Australian legal system must 
take the further step of accepting that native title is inseparable from 
the culture which gives its meaning.”256 
The scope of the recognition of Indigenous society as a source of 
public, or collective, rights has been limited by the High Court’s 
unquestioning acceptance of the Crown as sole sovereign. A major 
limitation was foreshadowed in the notion that the sovereignty of the 
state is non-justiciable.257 While the classification of the colony of 
 252. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Johnson, 21 U.S. 543; Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
 253. See Walker v. New S. Wales (1994) 126 A.L.R. 321; Coe v. Commonwealth (1993) 
118 A.L.R. 193. 
 254. Macklem, supra note 46, at 410, 414. Macklem argued that decisions that build upon 
these foundations (for example, the fiduciary duty) frustrate rather than facilitate a greater 
degree of self-determination. Id. at 412. 
 255. Paul Patton, Mabo, Freedom and the Politics of Difference, 30 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 
108, 111 (1995). 
 256. Dodson, supra note 250, at 2. 
 257. The High Court reiterated the view that any assertion of sovereignty was a challenge 
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New South Wales as settled was confirmed, the judges argued that 
this classification had no impact on the rights of the Indigenous 
peoples to retain their lands.258 Yet, settlement remains not only the 
justification for acquisition of sovereignty without consent, but also 
for the denial of other rights. This creates an inconsistency in the 
treatment of rights. Michael Mansell has argued: 
The Court refused to follow precedent on the issue of terra 
nullius for to do so would be to maintain a legal fiction based 
on political convenience. Yet the very same convenience was 
relied on by the Judges to shut the door to any Aboriginal 
hopes for arguing Aboriginal sovereignty in the courts. This 
aspect of the judgment is pure hypocrisy.259 
While embracing the continuity of Indigenous law and custom in 
relation to land title, the Australian courts have sought to avoid one 
of its implications, that is, a recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, 
which gives the land title its content and meaning.  
The Mabo case was an important precedent; however, reliance on 
a doctrine emerging from this decision requires a measure of caution. 
While rejecting the notion of superiority in relation to the use of land 
and, in the same context, the nature of political and social 
organization, the courts have refused to hear argument on the 
continuing sovereignty of Indigenous peoples. 
to the legitimacy of the state that could not be heard by a municipal court. Mabo v. Queensland 
II (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1, 31, 33, 69, 78–79, 95. However, sovereignty was not explicitly 
challenged in that case. See also Coe, 53 A.L.J.R. at 408; cf. McNeil, supra note 100, at 99. 
McNeil compiled an extensive survey of Australian and English decisions that support the view 
that acquisition of sovereignty by whatever means the Crown chooses is an act of state, the 
validity of which cannot be questioned in the courts. See Cook v. Sprigg, [1899] A.C. 572, 578 
(P.C.); Vajesingji v. Sec’y of State (1924) 51 I.A. 357, 360; Coe, 53 A.L.J.R. at 408; see also R 
v. Kent Justices, [1967] All E.R. 560, 564; Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd., (1968) 2 Q.B. 
740. 
 258. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 33, 58. 
 259. Michael Mansell, The Court Gives an Inch but Takes Another Mile, ABORIGINAL L. 
BULL., Aug. 1992, at 4. 
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